Copyright 1999. Rhode Island Historical Society. All rights reserved.
I receive intelligance every half hour of the enemies rapid approach. In consequence of which, I am sending of [off] my waggons. My numbers at this time are too weak to fight them[.][1
] I intend to move toward Salsbury in order to get Near the main army. I know thay intend to bring me to an action, which I [intend?] carefully to avoid.
I expect you will move some where on the Yadkin, to oppose their crossing. I think It would be advisable to join our forces and fight them, before they join Phillip, which thay certain[ly] will do, if thay are not stoped.[2
] I have ordered the commanding officer at Salbury move of [off] with the prisoners and stores. If you think it right youl repeat it.[3
] I cannot ascertain their number, but suppose them odds of two thousand— that number if thay keep in a compact body (which I make no doubt thay will) we cant hurt.[4
I have sent to Genl
Davidson to join me, which I expect he will do Tomorow. His strength I don know as his men were colecting yesterday.[5
] Morgan's confusion of Gen. William Phillips with Gen. Benedict Arnold is noted at PGNG, 7: 200, n2
. As also noted there, Cornwallis was not planning to unite with Arnold's force in Virginia.
] NG ordered the prisoners moved from Salisbury even before he received this letter. (See NG to Hyrne, this date, PGNG, 7: 194
.) On 2 February
, he also ordered the stores removed, but not, apparently, in confirmation of Morgan's orders, which have not been found. (See NG to Marbury, 2 February, PGNG, 7: 235
The Papers of General Nathanael Greene,
ed. Dennis Conrad et al.
(Columbia, S.C.: Model Editions Partnership, 1999). Full texts of documents calendared in
The Papers of General Nathanael Greene
(Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina Press, 1994), Vol. 7, pp. 152-289. On the Web at http://mep.blackmesatech.com/mep/ [Accessed 25 October 2017]